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Helgemo: Equity: Right to Jury Determination of Legal Issues in Equity

CASE COMMENT
RIGHT TO JURY DETERMINATION OF
LEGAL ISSUES IN EQUITY
Hightowerv. Bigoney, 145 So. 2d 505 (2d D.C.A. 1962)
The plaintiff architect contracted with the defendant to build a home
valued at $200,000. The plaintiff allegedly did the work, and subsequently placed a mechanic's lien on the home because of defendant's
failure to pay. He then attempted to foreclose the lien in equity. The
defendant counterclaimed for damages arising from plaintiff's alleged
negligence in supervision of the work and faulty specifications of materials. The defendant demanded a jury trial of certain legal issues
raised by his counterclaim, but the trial court entered an order striking
his demand. He then took an interlocutory appeal, claiming he could not
be denied his right to jury trial of the legal issues of fact involved in his
compulsory counterclaim. HELD, the denial of jury trial of the legal
issues was correct in this case. The court held that the equitable and
legal issues involved were intertwined and would call for extensive
accounting, and, therefore, "a conjunctive determination by the chancellor will best subserve the ends of justice."- The court implied that if
the counterclaim sought only legal relief, the defendant would be entitled to a jury.
The right to jury trial of legal issues of fact is guaranteed by the
Florida constitution.2 If a defendant does not file a counterclaim arising
out of the same transaction, he will be barred from later asserting this
claim in an independent action.8 The right of trial by jury and the compulsory counterclaim rule meet in sharp conflict in situations such as the
instant case wherein the original action is brought in equity and the defendant brings a compulsory counterclaim of a legal nature. This decision of the Second District Court of Appeal represents only one of the
alternative ways by which to resolve this conflict. 4
1. Hightower v. Bigoney, 145 So. 2d 505, 508 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
2. FLA. CONST. Dec. of Rights, §3; Wiggins v. Williams, 36 Fla. 637, 18 So.

859 (1896); Olin's Inc. v. Avis Rental Car Sys., 131 So. 2d 20 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
8. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.13(1); Pesce v. Linaido, 123 So. 2d 747 (3d D.C.A. Fla.
1960); Annot., 22 A.L.R. 2d 621 (1952).

4. Fleming James has recently suggested that the alternative adopted by the
court in Hightower may be unconstitutional. James, Right to a Jun Trial in Civil
Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 684 (1963). It should be noted that the federal constitution does not preserve the right to jury trial in the state courts. Walker v. Sauvinet,
92 U.S. 90 (1876).
[182]
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Many sections of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure are identical
to the federal rules. The Florida rules pertaining to the right to jury
trial of legal issues are among these.5 Therefore, the federal decisions
interpreting the federal rules are persuasive, although not binding on
the Florida courts' interpretation of similar Florida rules.0 After the new
federal rules of civil procedure were adopted, the federal courts were
faced with a problem similar to that in the present case. The Supreme
Court in Beacon Theatres Inc. v. Westover 7 established the guidelines
for the handling of such situations in the federal courts. That case held
that the defendant had the right to a jury trial of his compulsory legal
counterclaim. Speaking for the Court, Justice Black stated that "only
under the most imperative circumstances" can the right to a jury determination of legal issues be lost, and it cannot be lost merely because
the legal and equitable issues are mixed. He further declared that the
court could not anticipate circumstances under which "the right to
jury trial of legal issues could be lost through prior determination of
8
equitable claims."
The rule established by the Beacon Theatres case has been followed
by the federal courts. 9 In fact, it is now settled law in the federal courts
that the defendant has a right to jury trial even if the case is so complicated that it is necessary to appoint a master to assist the jury in unraveling the facts.' 0 The issues of fact that are common to both the equitable
and legal controversy are to be determined first by the jury," and these
findings of fact are binding as to the equitable controversy because of
collateral estoppel. 12
5. Fla. R. Civ. P. 2.1; Fed. R. Civ. P. 88.The federal and Florida rules pertaining
to compulsory counterclaims are not identical, but for the purpose of the subject
here involved the differences are insignificant. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.13(1); Fed. it. Civ.
P. 18(a).
6. The Florida courts have often cited Federal cases that interpret Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure similar or identical to Florida rules. E.g., in Hammac v. Windham, 119 So. 2d 822, 825 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1960) the court stated that "federal
decisions construing this rule [pertaining to dismissal] are pertinent to our decisions."
7. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
8. Id. at 511.
9. See Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962). In Thermo Stitch Inc. v.
Chemi Cord Processing Corp., 294 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1961) the court said that if
the "basic nature" of the controversy is equitable this does not allow the court to
deny a party the right to jury trial of incidental legal issues.
10. Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(b); La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
11. Beacon Theatres Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-11 (1959).
12. "The term 'collateral estoppel' is used to indicate that the binding effect of a
judgment as to matters actually litigated and determined in one action applies to
subsequent controversies between the parties involving a different cause of action
from that upon which the original judgment was based." RESTATmEN, JurMMu rrs
§45, comment a (1942).
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In Hightower v. Bigoney the court acknowledges the persuasiveness
of the federal court decisions in this area when it states:' 3
The present case is distinguishable from the several federal court
decisions holding that the defendant pleading a compulsory legal
counterclaim is entitled to a jury trial. In those cases the issues
were not so mixed as are the issues here presented. See, e.g., Lisle
Mills, Inc. v. Arkay Infants Wear, Inc., 1950, D.C.N.Y., 90 F.Supp.
676, wherein the defendant asserting the counterclaim sought
only legal relief.
In the first sentence of the above quote, the court refers to "several
federal court decisions." To which decisions is the court referring? One
would presume that the court was referring to the Beacon Theatresline
of cases which delineated the federal position on this issue. Yet the court
cites the Lisle Mills case as an example of the supposed distinctions between "the several federal court decisions" and the Hightowercase. The
Lisle Mills'4 case as a whole does not support the Hightower holding;
however, regardless of what it stands for, it seems ludicrous for the court
to rely on a federal district court case decided nine years before the
Beacon Theatres case.
The court in the Hightower case says "the several federal court decisions" are distinguishable because in 'those cases the issues were not
so mixed as in Hightower,and the counterclaims sought only legal relief.
If the court is referring to the Beacon Theatres line of cases these distinctions do not seem supportable. As brought out above in the discussion of the Beacon Theatres case, in the federal courts the fact that the
legal and equitable issues are mixed will not deprive the defendant of
his right to jury, because facts common to both legal and equitable
claims will be decided by the jury. Since the Beacon decision, the federal
courts have made no distinction between counterclaims seeking only
legal relief and 'those seeking both legal and equitable relief. If a defendant in the federal courts presents a bona fide legal issue in his
counterclaim that would determine a more than nominal proportion of
the entire controversy, he is entitled to a jury determination of these
issues.' 5 In the instant case the Florida court does not say that the legal
issues were merely nominal; in fact, no indication of their proportion is
given. Therefore, we are led to the conclusion that the quantum of legal
controversy was not a factor in the determination of the merits of the
demand for a jury. If the court is trying to distinguish the Hightower
13. Hightower v. Bigoney, supra note I, at 508.
14. Lisle Mills Inc. v. Axkay Infants Wear Inc., 90 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. N.Y.

1950).
15. Thermo Stitch Inc. v. Chemi Cord Processing Corp., 294 F.2d 486 (5th Cir.

1961).
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case from the Beacon Theatresline of cases the distinctions are arbitrary
and cannot be supported; the Hightower case is contrary to the Beacon
Theatresprinciple.
The holding in the Hightower case is primarily predicated on the
doctrine that once equity has jurisdiction it can give the parties fall
relief.'6 This doctrine has certain qualifications and may lead to erroneous results if the qualifications are disregarded. The jurisdiction of
equity must be voluntarily invoked for this rule to be applied? 7 In the
Hightower case the defendant had no choice but to bring his compulsory
counterclaim.' 8
Before the holding in this case, a defendant in the Florida courts
could not lose his right to a jury determination of legal issues unless he
waived this right.19 For example, in Marek v. Patterson,the defendant
had a compulsory counterclaim of a legal nature, but he failed to assert
his right to jury trial until the case was appealed.2 0 The court implied
that the defendant had a right to a jury trial by saying that at the appellate level it was too late to assert the right. The rule of voluntary
waiver was set out in the early case of Tilton v. Horton.2 ' In that case it
was held that the equity rule of procedure which made counterclaims
arising out of the same transaction compulsory, only applied to counterclaims of an equitable nature. The reason given for this restrictive reading of the rule was that if the defendant was forced to plead a legal
counterclaim he could be deprived of his right to jury trial.22 To deny a
jury to the defendant in a situation such as Hightower, is tantamount to
holding that the plaintiff, merely by framing his complaint to sound in
equity, can deprive a defendant, who is forced to bring a legal counterclaim, of his right to trial by jury. The previously established judicial
attitude toward the right to jury trial in Florida would not support such
23
a holding.
The Hightower case is significant because it presented a situation not
previously adjudicated by a Florida appellate court. The issue involved
16. "If the issues are interdependent and not clearly separable, and equity
jurisdiction has been properly invoked, the chancellor may adjudicate all interposed
claims, permissive, compulsory, equitable and legal and grant full and complete
relief as among all parties." Hightower v. Bigoney, supra note 1, at 508.
17. Gill v. Smith, 117 Fla. 176, 157 So. 657 (1934).
18. See text at note 3 supra.

19. Blanton v. Woodward, 107 Fla. 691, 144 So. 300 (1932); Jones-Mahoney
Corp. v. C. A. Fielland Inc., 114 So. 2d 18 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959); Ganaway v.
Henderson, 103 So. 2d 693 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1958); Miller v. Rolfe, 97 So. 2d 132

(1st D.C.A. Fla. 1957).
20. Marek v. Patterson, 75 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1954).

21. 103 Fla. 497, 137 So. 801 (1931).
22. Id. at 513, 137 So. at 807.

23. See cases cited note 19 supra.
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was whether a defendant in an equitable action, who brings a compulsory counterclaim that contains legal issues of fact, has a right to jury
determination of these legal issues.24 The court's disposition of the case
is particularly remarkable because it is neither consistent with previous
Florida appellate court decisions concerning the right to jury trial nor is
it in concurrence with the federal position. It would seem that the court
might have given its reasons for abandoning the established judicial
attitude which has so uncompromisingly preserved the right to trial by
jury.25

A primary purpose of the compulsory counterclaim rule is to eliminate a multiplicity of suits, or in more basic terms, to facilitate the administration of justice. The objective of expediting the administration of
justice has received a great deal of emphasis in the twentieth century.
Sometimes the courts in their zeal to empty their dockets go beyond the
letter and spirit of the new rules of civil procedure and encroach on
constitutional guarantees. One cannot argue with the truism that justice
should be administered as expeditiously as possible. Yet, the clear language of the Florida constitution that preserves the right to jury trial and
the many cases that interpret this section lead to the conclusion that the
Hightower case is a serious inroad on the right to trial by jury.
STMV

HELCEMO

24. The diagram below illustrates the uniqueness of the defendant's position. A
similar diagram depicting suits initiated originally at law would indicate no risk of
losing the right to jury.
A. Suit Brought in Equity by Plaintiff (no right to jury).
B. Defendant Brings Counterclaim That Is:
(1) Equitable Permissive (no right to jury).
(2) Equitable Compulsory (no right to jury).
(3) Legal Permissive (voluntary, therefore waiver attaches).
(4) Legal Compulsory (right to jury?) [Hightowercase].
The counterclaim in equity in the first and second situations above affords no party
a right to trial by jury. In the third situation, the permissive character of defendant's
counterclaim affords a voluntary act to which waiver can attach. Only in the fourth

situation is there actual deprivation of trial by jury.
25. It is interesting to note, that before the decision in Hightower, the editors
of Florida Jurisprudence took the position that, in a situation such as that in
Hightower, the court would be bound to preserve the defendant's right to a jury
determination of his legal compulsory counterclaim. This conclusion was based on
prior Florida decisions. See 8 FLA. Jur. Counterclaim§19 (1956).
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